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PUBLIUS WAS NOT A PAC: RECONCILING
ANONYMOUS POLITICAL SPEECH, THE
FIRST AMENDMENT, AND CAMPAIGN
FINANCE DISCLOSURE
Benjamin Barr* and Stephen R. Klein**
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging
the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the
people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the
Government for a redress of grievances.1

I. Introduction
Anonymous political speech has been the scorn of entrenched powers and
the saving balm of emerging voices throughout English and American history.
In its simplest terms, anonymous speech is communication that does not
identify the speaker or identifies a synonymous persona.2 Although for some,
anonymous political speech is inherently negative, its value remains of highest
constitutional import.

* B.A., B.S. University of Wyoming; J.D., Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute
of Technology; Mr. Barr serves of counsel to the Wyoming Liberty Group (www.wyliberty.org) and
is lead counsel to Free Speech in Free Speech v. Fed. Election Commission, a case challenging several
campaign finance regulations as unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. Mr. Barr formerly served
as special counsel to two Chairmen of the Federal Election Commission.
** B.A., Hillsdale College; J.D., Ave Maria School of Law; Mr. Klein is a staff attorney with
the Wyoming Liberty Group and co-counsel to Free Speech.
The authors thank Bruce Walker and the staff of the Wyoming Law Review for their valuable
input and editorial assistance. The authors also thank Susan Gore and the Wyoming Liberty Group
for support.
1

U.S. Const. amend. I.

2

See Black’s Law Dictionary 106 (9th ed. 2009).
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Unfortunately, modern campaign finance law eliminated many avenues
for anonymous political speech in both federal and state arenas. Under today’s
disclosure regimes, citizens who band together and spend as little as $1,000
criticizing or complimenting federal officeholders may be forced to register and
report as a political action committee (PAC) with the Federal Election Commission
(FEC).3 This includes identifying the group on advertisements and filing reports
that include the names and addresses of the group’s donors with the FEC, which
are then published online.4 Some state laws require such reporting from political
bloggers who spend as little as $91.38 for internet hosting.5
Ironically, today one of the most important influences on the ratification of
the United States Constitution would face civil and possibly criminal penalties
if it failed to register and report as a PAC. Publius, the collective author of The
Federalist Papers, would have to register if they discussed a political issue in
numerous states.6 As disclosure expands under federal law, Publius might also
be ensnared in federal regulations.7 Even if this were not burdensome in itself,
disclosure would reveal the identities of Alexander Hamilton, James Madison and
John Jay as the organization, and risk diminishing Publius’s effectiveness.8
Disclosure is, however, burdensome. Campaign finance disclosure not only
eliminates important avenues for anonymous political speech, but replaces such
free speech with cumbersome reporting regimes penalizing those who fail to
comply and those who do not accurately report the minutest details.9 Often, these
complicated and burdensome regulations inhibit free speech.10 Or as the Supreme
Court anticipated, “[f ]aced with the need to assume a more sophisticated
organizational form, to adopt specific accounting procedures, to file periodic
detailed reports . . . it would not be surprising if at least some groups decided that
the contemplated political activity was simply not worth it.”11
Today’s zealous push for all-encompassing disclosure—which replaces
political anonymity with complex, detailed reporting—injures our system of selfgovernment and is highly burdensome for average speakers. Disclosure is often

3

See infra notes 93 –136 and accompanying text.

4

See infra notes 93–119 and accompanying text.

See Bailey v. Maine Comm’n on Gov’t Ethics and Election Practices, 900 F. Supp. 2d 75,
88–93 (D. Me. Sept. 30, 2012).
5

6

See infra notes 93–119 and accompanying text.

7

See infra notes 118–136 and accompanying text.

8

See infra notes 30–38 and accompanying text.

9

See infra notes 93 –119 and accompanying text.

10

See infra notes 137–172 and accompanying text.

11

Fed. Election Comm’n v. Mass. Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. 238, 255 (1986).
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treated as an absolute good,12 with reformers claiming anyone scared off from
participating is just a “sissy.”13 Protecting anonymity is not an act of cowardice,
but a principle central to protecting our rich, Western tradition of reasoned, public
debate.14 We may achieve this protection without eliminating disclosure, instead
restoring bright-line standards within campaign finance law and recognizing the
need to achieve disclosure through the least restrictive means possible.
This article criticizes federal and state campaign finance disclosure laws on
First Amendment and political privacy grounds and offers several suggestions
for reform respectful of these concerns. Part II of this article offers a history of
anonymous speech and suppression of political speech generally.15 It also illustrates
the benefits of anonymous speech to political discourse and participation in the
American experiment. Part III is a political speech primer, laying out the basic
principles for protecting it constitutionally, and identifying the schism between
free speech and campaign finance reform.16 Part IV discusses the difficulty and
expense of complying with campaign finance disclosure. It also discusses efforts to
expand campaign finance disclosure laws to reach practically all political speech.17
Finally, Part V discusses the paradox surrounding legal protection of anonymous
speech, and offers various proposals to bolster political privacy.18

II. Anonymous Political Speech in the American Tradition
Before discussing the burdens of campaign finance disclosure on political
speech, it is important to establish the relevance of anonymous political
speech. Even when disclosure laws are simple enough for the average citizen to
understand, they foreclose most avenues of anonymity. Simply, this is because
these laws require political speech to include disclaimers that identify the speaker
Trevor Potter, president of the Campaign Legal Center, recently dismissed Justice Scalia’s
concern that “This campaign finance law is so intricate that I can’t figure it out.” Trevor Potter, The
Supreme Court needs to get smarter about politics, Wash. Post (Oct. 11, 2013), available at http://
www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-supreme-court-needs-to-get-smarter-about-politics/
2013/10/11/806c9c44-31b7-11e3-8627-c5d7de0a046b_story.html.
12

13
See, e.g., Ryan J. Reilly, Eschoo: Chamber Having ‘Sissy Fit’ Over Campaign Disclosure, TPM
Muckraker (June 3, 2011, 1:20 PM), http://tpmmuckraker.talkingpointsmemo.com/2011/06/
eshoo_chamber_having_sissy_fit_over_campaign_discl.php; Gadi Ben-Yehuda, SCOTUS: US Poli
tics No Place for Sissies, HuffPost Politics (June 25, 2010, 4:03 PM) http://www.huffingtonpost.
com/gadi-benyehuda/scotus-us-politics-no-pla_b_625221.html (last visited Nov. 26, 2013).
14
This “institution will be based on the illimitable freedom of the human mind. for [sic] here
we are not afraid to follow truth wherever it may lead, nor to tolerate any error so long as reason is
left free to combat it.” Letter from Thomas Jefferson to William Roscoe (Dec. 27, 1820), available
at http://www.loc.gov/exhibits/jefferson/75.html.
15

See infra notes 19–78 and accompanying text.

16

See infra notes 79 –92 and accompanying text.

17

See infra notes 93–136 and accompanying text.

18

See infra notes 137–205 and accompanying text.
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and for certain organizations to report the names of their contributors to the
government.19 Unlike political corruption, anonymity is not an evil to be cured.
In fact, considering the role of anonymous political speech in American history,
its benefits to individual speakers and political discourse at large far outweigh
its negative effects. This article identifies three liberty interests in anonymity
to secure: preventing prejudice, keeping the message central, and preventing
retaliation from those in power. This section discusses prominent historical
examples of anonymous political speech and describes various legitimate reasons
why Americans have elected to voice their political opinions anonymously.

A. The Federalist Papers
Anonymous political speech played a defining role in founding the United
States. Many citizens anonymously voiced their political opinions throughout the
several states. A small sampling includes “An American Citizen” in Pennsylvania,20
“Agrippa” in Massachusetts,21 “Cato” in New York,22 “A Landholder” in
Connecticut,23 “Civis Rusticus” in Virginia,24 “Civis” in South Carolina,25 and
“A Freeman” in Rhode Island.26 In short, “American opinion writers used so
many classical pseudonyms that their bylines read like the dramatis personae of
a history play.”27 The most popular explication of the Constitution encouraging
its ratification, however, was the joinder of Alexander Hamilton, James Madison,
and John Jay under the pen name “Publius” to publish discourses collectively
known as The Federalist Papers.28 The Federalist Papers were published almost
exclusively in New York newspapers in 1787 and 1788.29
Anonymity was central to the success of The Federalist Papers. “No secret
could have been more closely guarded than was the authorship of The Federalist
19

See, e.g., 2 U.S.C. § 434 (2012).

See, e.g., An American Citizen I, Independent Gazetteer, Sept. 26, 1787, reprinted in 1
The Debate on the Constitution 20–24 (Bernard Bailyn, ed., 1993) [hereinafter Debate 1].
20

21

See, e.g., “Agrippa” III, Mass. Gazette, Nov. 30, 1787, reprinted in Debate 1 at 443–45.

22

See, e.g., “Cato” I, N.Y. Journal, Sept. 27, 1787, reprinted in Debate 1 at 31–33.

See, e.g., Reply to Elbridge Gerry: “A Landholder” IV, Connecticut Courant, Nov. 26,
1787, reprinted in Debate 1 at 234–38.
23

24
See, e.g., Reply to Mason’s “Objections”: “Civis Rusticus,” Va. Ind. Chron., Jan. 30, 1788,
reprinted in Debate 1 at 353–62.

See, e.g., “Civis” to the Citizens of South Carolina, Columbian Herald, Feb. 4, 1788, reprinted
in 2 The Debate on the Constitution 147–54 (Bernard Bailyn, ed., 1993) [hereinafter Debate 2].
25

See, e.g., “A Freeman” to the Freeholders and Freemen of Rhode Island, Newport Herald,
March 20, 1788, reprinted in Debate 2 at 368–71.
26

See generally The Federalist. John Jay authored only five articles, limiting his participation
after coming down with rheumatoid arthritis. Richard Brookhiser, James Madison 63 (2011).
27

28

Brookhiser, supra note 27, at 64.

“Printed in only a dozen papers outside of New York, [The Federalist’s] larger influence was
spotty.” Ron Chernow, Alexander Hamilton 261 (2004).
29
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Papers. Even Hamilton’s best friends did not know what he was doing; if he
seemed busier than usual, it was ascribed to the flourishing state of his law
practice.”30 A 1792 French collection of The Federalist Papers named the authors,
but did not identify the respective essays of Hamilton, Madison, or Jay; such
identification did not occur until 1810, and even today there is still debate over
authorship of certain essays.31 Many expressed prejudice against Hamilton, thus
explaining his use of the name Publius. Hamilton often received attacks “jeering
at his foreign birth, his supposed racial identity, his illegitimacy and his putative
links to the British Crown—attacks that set a pattern for the rest of Hamilton’s
career. Since critics found it hard to defeat him on intellectual grounds, they
stooped to personal attacks.”32 Gouvernor Morris, a fellow Constitutional
Convention delegate, considered Hamilton “‘indiscreet, vain and opinionated.’”33
Even years after Hamilton’s death following a duel against Aaron Burr—the duel
itself an indicator of Hamilton’s polarizing nature—John Adams quipped that
Hamilton’s alleged “[v]ice, folly and villainy are not to be forgotten because the
guilty wretch repented in his dying moments.”34 Whatever the merit of these
criticisms, Hamilton had ample reason to remain anonymous and thereby prevent
prejudice against The Federalist Papers. The events surrounding the Constitution’s
inception also explain Hamilton’s desire for anonymity. He opposed numerous
Constitutional provisions at the drafting convention, and then decided to
support its ratification.35 Although media has changed greatly since the founding
era, it is quite likely Hamilton would have faced criticism for his “flip flop”
had he attached his name to The Federalist Papers so soon after opposing the
Constitution.36 Hamilton’s anonymity meant to avoid prejudice and preclude
obfuscation of his message, and these interests are still compelling justifications
for speaking anonymously.
Unlike Hamilton, James Madison was not a controversial figure, but
nonetheless he benefited from anonymity. Madison was a Virginian and given
the localism of the time, his work would not have been as well-received under
his own name in New York, nor might it have been published by New York

30
John C. Miller, Alexander Hamilton: Portrait in Paradox 189 (1959). See also
Chernow, supra note 29, at 249 (“Many people knew that Hamilton, Madison, and Jay were the
authors, but the trio proclaimed their authorship to only a chosen few and then mostly after the first
bound volume was published in March 1788.” (emphasis added)).
31

See, e.g., Frederick Mosteller & David L. Wallace, Inference and Disputed Author
Federalist (1964).

ship: The
32

Chernow, supra note 29, at 245 (emphasis added).

33

Chernow, supra note 29, at 712 (citation omitted).

34

Chernow, supra note 29, at 714 (citation omitted).

35

See generally Chernow, supra note 29, at 219–42.

See, e.g., David Zucker- John Kerry Flip Flop Ad, YouTube (Nov. 21, 2013), http://www.
youtube.com/watch?v=oThH-MNCsYw.
36

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 2014

5

Wyoming Law Review, Vol. 14 [2014], No. 1, Art. 9

258

Wyoming Law Review

Vol. 14

newspapers.37 Furthermore, in joining with a more controversial figure such as
Hamilton, Publius’s work might not have been well-received in Virginia either
absent anonymity.38 Madison’s example is just as compelling as Hamilton’s,
because it shows that anonymity is not merely a shroud for unpopular people, but
is just as relevant for anyone seeking to present a clear message.
The Federalist Papers did not cause a sweeping ratification of the Constitu
tion in New York, but they were a strong philosophical force. All nineteen
federalist delegates to the New York ratifying convention came from New York
City, including Hamilton himself, and were elected with the help of the papers.39
Entering the convention in June of 1888, however, the federalists were out
numbered by antifederalists two to one.40 Nevertheless, on July 26 after weeks
of debate the New York convention adopted the Constitution after several
antifederalists switched sides.41 In state ratifying conventions and among the
public at large, The Federalist Papers advocated under the single voice of Publius,
combining two voices from different regions with very different interests. “In
the two state conventions where the Constitution was most bitterly contested
and where its fate hung most precariously in the balance, ‘Publius’ was a potent
force on the Federalist side.”42 The Federalist Papers must not be ignored when
considering anonymous political advocacy, for without its benefit, it is quite likely
that neither the First Amendment nor Constitution would exist as we know them,
and therefore no legal basis on which to hinge anonymous debate would exist.

37
“Not only was Madison a Southerner and therefore unable to approach the Constitution
from the point of view of a New Yorker, but he also contributed a broad philosophical insight that
helped to elevate these essays far above the polemical writings of the day.” Miller, supra note 30,
at 189.

In Virginia The Federalist was distributed in bound form: “Madison sent hundreds of
copies to Virginia delegates, including John Marshall. The Federalist’s influence was to be especially
critical in New York and Virginia, two large states indispensable to the union’s long-term viability.”
Chernow, supra note 29, at 261.
38

39
Richard Brookhiser, Alexander Hamilton, American 72 (1999). See also Miller, supra
note 30, at 209–10.
40

Chernow, supra note 29, at 262.

41

Id. at 267– 68.
[I]n mid-July, the two sides remained unalterably apart . . . . Days later, Melancton
Smith finally broke the deadlock when he endorsed the Constitution if Congress
would promise to consider some amendments. Paying indirect tribute to Hamilton,
Smith credited “the reasonings of gentlemen” on the other side for his changed vote.
On July 26, Smith and a dozen other antifederalists switched their votes to favor the
Constitution, producing a wafer-thin majority . . . the smallest margin of victory at
any state convention . . . .

Chernow, supra note 29, at 268. Melancton Smith was “the most capable debater on the [anti
federalist] side.” Brookhiser, supra note 27, at 73.
42

Miller, supra note 30, at 207.
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B. Early American Experiments in Speech Retaliation
While it is important to avoid prejudice and keep a focused message as Publius
did, the ability to carefully speak truth to power is perhaps the most compelling
reason for anonymous political speech. As American history illustrates, during
the colonial and post-colonial eras, speaking without the protection of anonymity
sometimes brought about grave and unfortunate results. In 1753, Daniel Fowle
printed the pamphlet The Monster of Monsters, in which he shared his strong
negative opinions of some members of the Massachusetts Legislature.43 Due to
suspicion of his authorship of this publication, Fowle was jailed for two days.44
Ten years later in New York, Alexander McDougall spent three months in jail
for publishing a handbill criticizing the New York Assembly.45 In 1800, David
Brown was sentenced to 18 months imprisonment under the Sedition Act for
inscribing on a liberty pole in Massachusetts: “May moral virtue be the basis of
civil government.”46 In the 1830s, James Fenimore Cooper, author of the Last of
the Mohicans, decried the negative role of the press and brought fourteen libel suits
against various newspapers to quell negative discussions of his political views.47
One theme remains constant: no one enjoys being criticized and, when given the
opportunity, those in power will quell dissent.
In the early years of the United States, the Framers understood, somewhat
imperfectly, that laws penalizing speech harmed a free society.48 Knowledgeable
of the history of Tudor and Stuart England, the Framers sought to entirely forbid
freewheeling speech licensing, regulations, and bans that were so common in
Britain.49 Benjamin Franklin commented that whoever would “overthrow the
liberty of a nation must begin by subduing the freeness of speech.”50 Richard
43

Isaiah Thomas, The History of Printing in America 133–34 (1874).

44

Id. at 129–32.

45

Leonard Williams Levy, Emergence of a Free Press 30 (1985).

Frederick S. Allis, Jr., Boston and the Alien Sedition Laws, in Proceedings of the Bostonian
Society 25–51 (1951).
46

Louis Edward Ingelhart, Press
80 –82 (1995).
47

and

Speech, Freedoms

in

America, 1619–1995

48
Some who publicly pressed for robust First Amendment protections also helped generate
speech-suppressing laws like the Sedition Acts. James Grant, John Adams: Party of One 405–06
(2005) (“John Adams had not asked Congress to pass the Sedition Act, but he willingly signed
it, believing, along with virtually every other Federalist, in the doctrine of ‘seditious libel.’ That
is, he believed that the government could be criminally assaulted with words.”). Human nature
and hypocrisy aside, the overall understanding of the Founding Era was in favor of robust speech
as a means to keep government in check. Eugene Volokh, Freedom for the Press as an Industry, or
for the Press as a Technology? From the Framing to Today, 160 U. Pa. L. Rev. 459, 465–68 (2012)
(citing numerous sources encouraging protection of a free press, many based on the freedom to
criticize government).
49

First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 800–01 (1978) (Burger, C.J., concurring).

50

Robert J. Wagman, The First Amendment Book 28 (1991).
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Henry Lee explained that the freedom of press and speech were fundamental
rights and that “bad men could easily abuse a law made by good men who believed
that freedom of the press should be restrained because it disturbed the operations
of new governments.”51 John Adams reasoned that both speech and the press were
integral to freedom because people have a “right, an indisputable, divine right,
to that most dreaded and envied kind of knowledge. I mean of the character
and conduct of their rulers.”52 In sum, Americans generally understood speech
might sometimes be disruptive, uninformed and uncouth, but efforts to control
it suppressed liberty no matter the parade of good intentions behind such efforts.
To be certain, early aspirations for protecting speech were dashed—sometimes
by those promoting its very virtue. For example, John Adams once proclaimed the
importance of enabling citizenry to vigorously debate and discuss the qualifications
of public servants. However, as president, he signed the Sedition Act,53 largely due
to public criticism against the government and Federalists.54 Adams’s presidency
favored punishing false, scandalous or malicious speech—if it pertained to
him or his allies that is. The Sedition Act led to numerous investigations and
convictions for controversial speeches attacking the character of John Adams or
his administration.55
Although “[t]he protection given speech and press was fashioned to assure
unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social
changes desired by the people[,]”56 even in the colonial and founding eras around
the drafting of the First Amendment the American government failed to respect
the principle time and again. Anonymity is one way to hinder retaliation from
those in power, and must be considered a component of free speech. This is
arguably more important today for “[t]here exists in modern America the necessity
for protecting all of us from arbitrary action by governments more powerful and
more pervasive than any in our ancestors’ time.”57

51

Ingelhart, supra note 47, at 47.

52

Bernard Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution 56 (1973).

The Sedition Act imposed a prison sentence of up to two years against “any person [who]
shall write, print, utter or publish, or shall cause or procure to be written, printed, uttered or
published, or shall knowingly and willingly assist or aid in writing, printing, uttering or publishing
any false, scandalous and malicious writing or writings against the government of the United
States . . . .” 1 Stat. § 596–97 (1798).
53

54

Grant, supra note 48, at 405.

55

Id.

56

Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957).

William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 Harv.
L. Rev. 489, 491 (1977).
57
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C. Democracy: An American Novel
Perhaps the best example of anonymous political speech following ratification
of the Constitution came about a century into the American experiment, and it
combines all three interests previously discussed—preventing prejudice, keeping
the message central, and preventing retaliation from those in power. Henry
Adams, great-grandson of President John Adams and grandson of President John
Quincy Adams, was a historian and political socialite living in Washington, D.C.
Henry Adams wrote the book Democracy: An American Novel. It was published
anonymously and opened the public’s eyes to political change centering upon a
conflict of politics and morality, and effectively interrupted the career of a rising
political star.58
Democracy, though fictional, was aimed at derailing the career of Speaker of
the House James G. Blaine.59 In 1872, Blaine was accused of accepting $2 million
of stock in Union Pacific railroad.60 Though a congressional investigation cleared
him, “[o]n the basis of direct acquaintance, data obtained by word of mouth, and
information in the public prints, [Adams] had come to think that Speaker Blaine
was corruption incarnate . . . .”61 Adams feared Blaine would be nominated for
president in 1876 or possibly appointed secretary of state under the nomination
winner. Though Adams had been working on his novel for some time,
[t]he Blaine horror had acquired an urgency for Adams that
would be hard to exaggerate. With Blaine in mind, Adams
re-shaped Democracy to meet three requirements. The novel had
to be so baited as to attract large crowds of readers. It had to
be so barbed that if published in November-December 1876
immediately after a [Republican Rutherford B.] Hayes victory,
it would stop Hayes from choosing Blaine to be secretary of
state. And it had to be so barbed that if it was withheld while
[Democratic candidate Samuel] Tilden served as president but
was published in the spring of 1880, it would destroy Blaine’s
chance of winning the Republican nomination for president in
that year.62
Hayes won the 1876 election. However, controversy surrounding the win made
publishing Democracy unnecessary at that time as the fallout ensured “[Hayes]
58
Henry Adams, Democracy: An American Novel (1880), reprinted in Henry Adams:
Novels, Mont Saint Michel, The Education (1983).
59
Edward Chalfant, Better in Darkness: A Biography of Henry Adams, His Second Life
1862–1891 329 (1994).
60

Id.

61

Id. at 289.

62

Id. at 329.
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would thus be placed on his best behavior and could not choose Blaine as
secretary of state.”63 Blaine would cause other controversies in the meantime, but
by 1880 he was again in the running for the presidential nomination after Hayes
announced he would not seek a second term.
Adams published Democracy anonymously on April 1, 1880, two months
before the Republican convention in Chicago. The novel’s antagonist, Senator
Ratcliffe, mirrored Blaine in many respects, emphasized by his ambition and
corruption. The novel’s theme centered on the importance of preventing Ratcliffe’s
ascendancy to the Presidency. Although the Ratcliffe character could be associated
with persons other than Blaine,64 Blaine cut ties with the book’s suspected authors
soon after its publication.65 He also embarked on a quest to find out who was
behind the book, and at one point pinned authorship on Adams’s wife Clover.66
The book was a “publisher’s bonanza”67 and played a role in forcing Blaine to
end his candidacy and support the nomination of James A. Garfield.68 Blaine was
secretary of state under Garfield and won the Republican presidential nomination
in 1884, but never won the Presidency.
Commentators understand that anonymity was necessary for Adams to
provide such a biting critique of Blaine: “The men and women he witheringly
depicted in his novel, Adams knew, were not well disguised. So it was all the more
important that he himself should be.”69 Not only did Adams protect himself from
retaliation, but he elevated the impact of his work. “Adams kept his authorship
secret for a reason relating to the novel’s power. Once the novel was published,
its anonymous author all by himself would have . . . influence . . . and the author
would continue to have influence as long as the public remained unsure about

63

Id. at 334.

Some argue that Blaine cannot be easily associated with Senator Ratcliffe, “[t]he parallels
are not very close.” Gary L. Wills, Henry Adams: The Historian as Novelist 579, 597 (2003), available
at http://tannerlectures.utah.edu/_documents/a-to-z/w/wills_2003.pdf. Nevertheless, James Blaine
certainly considered the parallels close enough.
64

65

Chalfant, supra note 59, at 411.

66

Id. at 452.

67

Id. at 399.

68

Id. at 399– 400.

David Greenberg, Democracy: Why it’s the only lasting anonymous Washington novel, Slate
(Apr. 20, 2011, 2:28 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/history_lesson/2011/
04/democracy.html (last visited Nov. 26, 2013). Greenberg also offers praise for the timelessness of
Democracy, contrasting it to other novels that critique American democracy: “The appeal of most
Washington novels rests in their resonance with current events. After Joe Klein was ousted as the
author of the Primary Colors, popular interest in reading the book plummeted. Klein’s sequel, The
Running Mate, written under his own name, drew little attention. Most Washington novels are not
literature but punditry by other means.” Id.
69
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the authorship.”70 The public only learned the authorship of Democracy long after
Blaine’s death, thirty-five years after its publication.71 In addition to avoiding
Blaine’s powerful influence and protecting his career as a historian, Adams could
rest assured that Democracy’s message spoke for itself.
American history offers many examples of the value and impact of anonymous
political speech—whether published in a pamphlet like The Monster of Monsters,
a series of articles like The Federalist Papers, or a full-length novel like Democracy.
Anonymity serves several interests for free speech, but its widespread presence
is equally notable. Indeed, that so many Americans have opted to speak about
politics anonymously indicates it is an accepted practice, and one that continues today.

D. Anonymity Today
While rigorous debate continues over the propriety of anonymous speech
in the political sphere, its use continues where it is available. American media—
television, radio, and newspaper—rely on anonymous sources, while on the
Internet anonymous speech is often more prevalent than named authorship.
Although reporters usually identify themselves as authors of articles and
editorial boards are easily identified in newspapers, both editorials and articles
utilize anonymous opinions, especially in political reporting.72 The use of
anonymous sources remains a hotly debated topic,73 but there is no serious effort to
ban the practice. Indeed, the folly of such an effort is apparent: reporters exposed
the most notorious political scandal of the 20th Century, Watergate, with the
help of the famous anonymous source, Deep Throat, whose true identity was not
revealed until 2005—more than 30 years after Richard Nixon’s resignation.74 The
70

Chalfant, supra note 59, at 328–29.

71

Greenberg, supra note 69.

72
See, e.g., Amy Goldstein, Lena H. Sun & Sandhya Somashekhar, Rush of interest continues
on insurance Web sites, Wash. Post (Oct. 2, 2013), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/
national/health-science/obamacare-site-goes-live-with-some-glitches/2013/10/01/380a4300-2a9d11e3-8ade-a1f23cda135e_print.html (“‘Very, very few people that we’re aware of have enrolled in
the federal exchange,’ said one insurance industry official, who like many in the industry, spoke on
the condition of anonymity out of concern for possibly offending the Obama administration.”). See
also Sarah Abrams, Woodward and Bernstein Defend Anonymous Sources, Harvard Kennedy School
(Dec. 5, 2005), available at http://www.hks.harvard.edu/news-events/news/articles/woodwardand-bernstein-defend-anonymous-sources.
73
See, e.g., Politico’s Martin Defends Use of Unnamed Sources, Real Clear Politics (Aug. 19,
2012), http://www.realclearpolitics.com/video/2012/08/19/politicos_martin_defends_use_of_
unnamed_sources.html (last visited Nov. 26, 2013).
74
David Von Drehle, FBI’s No. 2 Was ‘Deep Throat’: Mark Felt Ends 30-Year Mystery of
The Post’s Watergate Source, Wash. Post (June 1, 2005), available at http://www.washingtonpost.
com/politics/fbis-no-2-was-deep-throat-mark-felt-ends-30-year-mystery-of-the-posts-watergatesource/2012/06/04/gJQAwseRIV_story.html.
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interest of protecting oneself while speaking truth to—or simply about—those
in power remains as strong today as in generations past. Ironically, however, the
Watergate scandal played a large role in influencing the creation of the Federal
Election Commission,75 which began enforcing campaign finance disclosure in
earnest, cutting off many forms of anonymous political speech. This problem will
be discussed in the following sections.76
While institutional media utilizes anonymous sources, the best example of
direct anonymous political speech occurs every second on the Internet in chat
rooms, message boards, and social media. Internet anonymity is afforded a great
deal of protection.77 Unlike traditional political speech, anonymity is a presumed
facet of free speech on the Internet.78 Internet speech is often of questionable
value, but its prevalence cannot be denied.
From The Federalist Papers to Democracy to modern Internet and press
practices, the impact of anonymous speech is clear. The value of speech can
greatly increase when the message is removed from the speaker. Furthermore,
speakers often have a legitimate interest in shielding their identities from those
in power and from their neighbors. These benefits of anonymous political speech
must not be dismissed when considering campaign finance laws that abridge—or
entirely restrict—anonymity.

III. A Primer on Political Speech
Within the context of the First Amendment, many Supreme Court Justices
regularly acknowledge the special protection afforded political speech and
association. The Court recognizes that the concept of American self-governance is
itself dependent on this freedom, for it “fosters the public exchange of ideas that
is integral to deliberative democracy.”79 This free trade of ideas allows the citizenry
to best govern themselves by seeking out information, contributing to debates,

75
John W. Dean, Watergate’s Unanswered Questions: 40 Years of Hindsight, 16 Chapman L.
Rev. 1, 6 (2012) (“Watergate caused Washington to reexamine the way it did business, and that,
in turn, provoked many reforms. . . . Congress adopted a number of new campaign finance and
reporting laws and created the Federal Elections [sic] Commission.”).
76

See infra notes 79–92 and accompanying text.

See, e.g., Matthew Mazzotta, Note, Balancing Act: Finding Consensus on Standards for
Unmasking Anonymous Internet Speakers, 51 B.C. L. Rev. 833 (2010).
77

78
Even the Campaign Legal Center, which vigorously supports campaign finance laws, once
supported unfettered Internet speech. See, e.g., Comments on Notice 2005–10, Campaign Legal Center
15 (2005), available at http://www.campaignlegalcenter.org/attachments/FEC_PROCEEDINGS/
1381.pdf (“This rule would make clear, appropriately so, that individuals engaging in unfettered
political discourse over the Internet using their own computer facilities (or those publicly available)
would not be subject to regulation under the campaign finance laws . . . .”).
79

Duryea Bor. Ct. v. Guarnieri, 131 S.Ct. 2488, 2495 (2011).
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and keeping government accountable. Thus, the right of the citizenry to discourse
in a free market of ideas is a “precondition to enlightened self-government and a
necessary means to protect it . . . .”80
Actions destroying political privacy destroy free society. Alexis de Tocqueville
understood as much when he explained:
If men living in democratic countries had no right and no
inclination to associate for political purposes, their independence
would be in great jeopardy, but they might long preserve their
wealth and their cultivation: whereas if they never acquired the
habit of forming associations in ordinary life, civilization itself
would be endangered.81
The First Amendment vigorously protects both free speech and association
because both are the underpinnings of our democratic republic. This freedom
stems from the fundamental principle that people are capable of self-governance.
Self-governance includes an individual’s ability to receive information, process it,
and make subsequent decisions based on their own individual ability and interest.82
Although many members of the Supreme Court recognize the value of political
speech and association, others place greater concern on risks associated with
exercising those liberties; specifically, the potential for corruption stemming from
acts of political speech and association. Perhaps best stated by Justice Brandeis,
“[p]ublicity is justly commended as a remedy for social and industrial diseases.
Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants; electric light the most efficient
policeman.”83 This schism—valuing the exercise of unabridged First Amendment
freedoms or valuing concerns about corruption in the public sphere—is an
important factor in understanding how individual justices approach and interpret
issues involving political speech and association.
Due to this pronounced schism, the Supreme Court divides political
speech and associational rights into four primary categories, each with differing
constitutional concerns: (1) money contributions to candidates, (2) express
advocacy speech, (3) electioneering communications, and (4) issue advocacy

80

Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 339 (2010).

81

Alexis de Tocqueville, 2 Democracy in America 115 (Henry Reeve, trans.) (1841).

See First Nat. Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 792 n.31 (1978) (“Government
is forbidden to assume the task of ultimate judgment, lest the people lose their ability to
govern themselves.”).
82

Louis D. Brandeis, What Publicity Can Do, Harper’s Wkly, Dec. 20, 1913 at 10, available
at http://3197d6d14b5f19f2f440-5e13d29c4c016cf96cbbfd197c579b45.r81.cf1.rackcdn.com/
collection/papers/1910/1913_12_20_What_Publicity_Ca.pdf.
83
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speech.84 In creating these distinctions, the Supreme Court made two important
distinctions in Buckley v. Valeo. First, the newly enacted Federal Election Campaign
Act involved complicated provisions, but was limited by the Court in its reach so
the average individual could comply with it.85 Congress can concoct amazingly
detailed and lengthy speech regulations where only electoral experts may ensure
protection from penalties under the law. However, this is unconstitutional because
average speakers cannot comply with such a system.86 Second, although laws may
be enacted to stem governmental corruption, these statutes must err in favor of
permitting speech, rather than restricting it, due to concerns about overbroad
and inappropriate application of statutes.87 Far-reaching, near-utopian visions of
preventing corruption or its appearance are constitutionally unworkable due to
their tendency to err on the side of suppressing—rather than valuing—speech.88
These two foremost considerations lead the Buckley Court to distinguish between
the legal terms “express advocacy” (subject to limited regulation) and “issue
advocacy” (subject to little or no regulation).89
The guiding wisdom of the Buckley Court, later reinforced by Citizens United,
instills binding considerations for any system of campaign finance disclosure. Like
other areas of protected First Amendment expression, clarity and precision must
be the touchstones of regulation.90 Although disclosure may be appropriate in

84
The first category of protected political speech and association is contributions, or direct
monetary donations to candidates or organizations involved in the political process. Because of the
direct monetary exchange and greater risk of corruption, the Supreme Court has protected this
category of political speech and association the least. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 23–38, 74–82
(1976). The second category is express advocacy, also known as “independent expenditures,” which
is speech calling for the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate. Express advocacy may be
subject to limited disclosure, but not otherwise limited. Id. at 39–59, 74–82. The third category is
the ill-defined “functional equivalent of express advocacy,” which will only be discussed in limited
reference in this article. See, e.g., Fed. Election Comm’n v. Wis. Right to Life, 551 U.S. 449, 469–76
(2007). The last category, and most strongly protected, is issue advocacy, which is speech discussing
political or moral issues that might be connected to candidates or elections but rests outside the
ambit of government regulation.
85

Buckley, 424 U.S. at 76–82.

Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108–09 (1972) (“A vague law impermissibly
delegates basic policy matters to policemen, judges, and juries for resolution on an ad hoc and
subjective basis, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory applications.”).
86

87

Buckley, 424 U.S. at 64.

88

See id. at 26.

89

See id. at 39–44.

See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 324 (2010) (“The First
Amendment does not permit laws that force speakers to retain a campaign finance attorney, conduct
demographic marketing research, or seek declaratory rulings before discussing the most salient
political issues of our day.”).
90
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limited instances,91 all-encompassing or blurry disclosure schemes suffer from the
same constitutional maladies as described in Buckley and this wisdom must be
incorporated in today’s programs. These distinctions are, after all, the primary
moving purpose behind Buckley’s formulation of the express advocacy test
and the Supreme Court’s continued insistence on objective speech guidelines.
This approach includes a baseline respect for meaningful boundaries between
regulated and non-regulated speech as well as agreed limits to the reach of any
such program.92

IV. Disclosure’s Oppressive Nature
Campaign finance disclosure can inflict major injuries on speakers. Current
campaign finance disclosure laws leave muddled confusion in the wake of
attempts to sort out the law’s requirements and details. Disclosure laws are rarely
simple, thus keeping many average Americans out of the political process entirely.
Furthermore, the particular types of political speech these disclosure laws cover is
equally confusing.

A. Lost in Disclosure: Confusion upon Confusion Muffles Speech
When supporters of campaign finance laws promote the benefits of disclosure,
they often omit or deny the fact that compliance with political registration and
reporting requirements is difficult.93 As the Supreme Court explained in Citizens
United v. Federal Election Commission, the “FEC has adopted 568 pages of
regulations, 1,278 pages of explanations and justifications for those regulations,
and 1,771 advisory opinions since 1975.”94 Under federal law, if a group of
neighbors, a community coalition, or a nonprofit organization wishes to spend
more than $1,000 addressing political issues possibly related to candidates for

Although the exercise of speech and association has a preferred place over regulation, the
Supreme Court permits disclosure in limited instances, specifically when it: (1) deters actual or
perceived corruption; (2) provides the electorate with relevant information about who is speaking;
or (3) provides information about violations of the law. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 66–68.
91

92
The very history of case law leading up to Buckley included national arguments over the
vagueness and overbreadth contained in emerging federal campaign finance laws, ultimately leading
to their circumscription. See, e.g., United States v. Nat’l Comm. for Impeachment, 469 F.2d 1135,
1139–42 (2d Cir. 1972); Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Jennings, 366 F. Supp. 1041, 1055–57
(D.D.C. 1973).

Campaign Finance – Stossel in the Classroom, YouTube (Nov. 21 2013), http://www.
youtube.com/watch?v=QeHxSW52Hmc (including a claim by Cecilia Martinez of the Reform
Institute that complying with disclosure is “very simple” and that the complexity of Colorado’s
disclosure system is justified because it was the result of “voter sentiment”).
93

94

558 U.S. 310, 334 (2010).
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federal office, they must wade through this morass.95 If they can even make
sense of the law, they may be required to register and report as a political action
committee (PAC).96
PAC-style disclosure is not simple. Once forced to report as a PAC, groups must
“appoint a treasurer, forward donations to the treasurer promptly, keep detailed
records of the identities of the persons making donations, preserve receipts for three
years, and file an organization statement and report changes to this information
within 10 days.”97 PACs must detail their receipts in ten different categories,
account for all disbursements in twelve different categories, inform the government
how much cash on hand they have, and much more.98 While the complexity of all
this is apparent, some scholars have empirically studied the effect of mandatory
disclosure at the state level, unsurprisingly concluding that complicated reporting
regimes are difficult to complete for even well-educated citizens.99
The following is a typical scenario illustrating how complexity muffles
speech. Imagine a small coalition of citizens in rural Wyoming chipping in funds
to raise $10,000 to run a simple message about environmental policy during the
2014 election cycle. Suppose three ranchers contribute $3,000 each and raise the
remaining funds from small contributions in the local community. The group
wishes to speak out about the Government Litigation Savings Act and link the
issue to each candidate’s stances for office.100 While the group does not intend
to support or oppose these candidates for election, it wants to get its message
out provocatively and in its own words. It also knows people pay most attention
to political advertising around elections, so it decides to run its advertisements
within a month of the general elections.101
To comply with federal election law, the group must understand whether its
speech is considered “express advocacy” or an “electioneering communication.”
Technically, these areas are the only type of speech subject to federal regulation.102
95

Id. at 337–39.

96

See 2 U.S.C. § 431(4) (2012).

97

Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 338 (2010).

98

2 U.S.C. §§ 434(a)(4), (b) (2012).

See, e.g., Jeffrey Milyo, Campaign Finance Red Tape: Strangling Free Speech & Political Debate,
Institute for Justice (Oct. 2007), available at http://www.ij.org/images/pdf_folder/other_pubs/
CampaignFinanceRedTape.pdf.
99

100

See generally Government Litigation Savings Act, H.R. 1996, 112th Cong. (2011).

This is a modified version of some facts in Free Speech v. Fed. Election Comm’n, an ongoing
lawsuit. The authors are counsel to Free Speech. See Free Speech v. Fed. Election Comm’n, Wyo. Liberty
Grp., http://wyliberty.org/legal-center/free-speech-v-federal-election-commission/ (last visited Nov.
21, 2013).
101

See Fed. Election Comm’n v. Wis. Right to Life (WRTL), 551 U.S. 449, 457 (2007)
(rejecting restrictions on corporate issue advocacy); see also Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 366–71
(upholding disclosure requirements for electioneering communications).
102
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This determination is very difficult given the number of administrative
complications created by the FEC and contradictory advice issued over the years.
Additionally, the group must determine if it is regulated as a PAC or not. This
will be just as difficult due to the extensive complicated policies surrounding
PAC status. For guidance, the group must hire an attorney familiar with federal
election law who can advise them on complying with at least these two issues. To
be diligent, the attorney may need to file an advisory opinion request with the
FEC asking for its formal guidance, a process taking up to sixty to ninety days
after filing.103 Assume the group can find a low-priced, $200-an-hour election law
specialist who can provide initial guidance after ten billable hours.104 If the attorney
drafts a formal advisory opinion request and appears before the Commission, this
could easily add an additional thirty billable hours.105 Once the FEC issues an
advisory opinion, the attorney must explain what it means to the group and how
to comply with the law going forward. Assuming this requires another five billable
hours,106 the process up to this point totals $9,000 in legal fees.
Once the group understands the law’s reach, and assuming the attorney advises
the group to register as a PAC, it must appoint a treasurer to complete its formal
bookkeeping.107 It might find a volunteer for this, but treasurers are personally liable
under federal election law for the acts of the PAC, thus discouraging volunteers.108
The FEC advises that to ensure “best practices” (a way to prevent higher fines and
penalties for violations) or create “safe harbors,” the group should also hire an
assistant treasurer.109 To comply with other “best practices” suggestions, the group
must adopt specified accounting practices and employ professional compliance
experts.110 Whether a group takes these extra steps or not, compliance requires
regular reporting, additional legal fees, and administrative costs. At this point,
the group has already spent $9,000 of its $10,000 budget simply attempting to
understand the law. The group’s remaining $1,000 is hardly sufficient to cover the
ongoing compliance costs let alone fund a message.

103

See 2 U.S.C. § 437f (2012).

The authors have a combined experience of fifteen years in federal campaign finance law,
and can attest to the veracity of these estimates. Although some campaign finance experts (especially
those located in the Capitol Beltway) could provide guidance in less time, their hourly rates could
be double or triple the $200 assumed in this scenario.
104

105

Id.

106

Id.

107

2 U.S.C. § 432(a) (2012).

108

See 2 U.S.C. § 437g(d) (2012).

See Statement of Policy; Safe Harbor for Misreporting Due to Embezzlement, 72 Fed.
Reg. 16695 (Apr. 5, 2007), available at http://www.fec.gov/law/cfr/ej_compilation/2007/notice_
2007-9.pdf.
109

110

Id.
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On the other hand, if the group decides to register as a PAC in the first
place, it must still allocate a substantial portion of its meager $10,000 budget to
compliance costs. In the 2012 cycle, that meant filing at least seven compliance
reports during the year if the group elected to file quarterly with the FEC.111
Assuming an attorney spends two hours per compliance report and bills at $200
an hour, $2,800 of the allocated budget is expended. Add bookkeeping services
and formal treasurer costs and costs might double. Less than half of the funds
raised may remain to fund the group’s speech.
Under either of these scenarios, disclosure is still touted as helping democracy
and ensuring grassroots voices are heard in the political process.112 Few reformers
consider how many voices have been shut out and how many grassroots coalitions
muted in pursuing this lofty goal.113 Furthermore, these scenarios assume perfect
compliance with the law. Failure to comply—be it bookkeeping mistakes, staff
scandals, or misunderstanding the law—could result in administrative fines further
diminishing available funds. Additionally, the speakers might suffer financial
hardship further preventing future participation in the political process.114
States usually follow the FEC’s lead, imposing equally onerous and confusing
political speech regulations at the local level.115 For example, in Colorado,
concerned citizens opposing annexation of their neighborhood into the town of
Parker found themselves mired in the machinery of state campaign finance laws.116

111
See 2012 Reporting Dates, Federal Election Comm’n, http://www.fec.gov/info/report_
dates_2012.shtml.
112
See generally 2012 Election Spending Will Reach $6 Billion, Center for Responsive Politics
Predicts, OpenSecrets.org, Oct. 31, 2012, http://www.opensecrets.org/news/2012/10/2012election-spending-will-reach-6.html (last visited Nov. 26, 2013) (“With no requirements to disclose
where the money is coming from, voters in 2012 have been left with no real means to judge the
credibility of the message or consider any hidden agendas leading those donors to give.”).

The FEC recently argued in a brief that PAC disclosure cannot be burdensome, since “Of
the 6,975 PACs that were registered with the Commission as of November 2012, more than 2,670
registered after Citizens United was decided in January 2010, and these PACs spent more than $687
million on independent expenditures to influence federal elections over the past three years.” Brief
for Appellee Federal Election Commission at 44, Free Speech v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 720 F.3d
788 (2013) (No. 12-8078), available at http://www.fec.gov/law/litigation/freespeech_fec_brief.pdf.
113

See supra notes 93–110 and accompanying text; see also MUR 5957 (The Committee
to Elect Sekhon for Congress), Statement of Reasons of Vice Chairman Peterson and Commis
sioners Hunter and McGahn, FEC (June 24, 2009), available at http://eqs.nictusa.com/eqsdocs
MUR/29044243959.pdf. But see Fred Wertheimer & Don Simon, The FEC: The Failure to Enforce
Commission, Am. Const. Soc’y at 14–15 (Jan. 2013), available at http://www.democracy21.org/
wp-content/uploads/2013/02/Wertheimer-and-Simon-The-Failure-to-Enforce-Commission-.
pdf (cryptically classifying the Sekhon case as evidence of “the refusal of the Republican [FEC]
commissioners to enforce the laws”).
114

115
See, e.g., Disclosure and Regulation of Campaign Contributions and Expenditures, 9 Ill.
Comp. Stat. 5 (2013).
116

See Sampson v. Buescher, 625 F.3d 1247, 1251–53 (10th Cir. 2010).
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Shortly after they began speaking out, a neighbor with an opposing viewpoint filed
a complaint against the six most vocal members, and threatened to file additional
complaints against anyone daring to put a yard sign opposing the annexation.117
Fortunately, the Tenth Circuit Federal Court of Appeals deemed the state laws
in question unconstitutional as applied, noting that the “average citizen cannot
be expected to master on his or her own the many campaign financial-disclosure
requirements set forth in Colorado’s constitution, the Campaign Act, and the
Secretary of State’s Rules Concerning Campaign and Political Finance.”118
The application of overbroad and onerous disclosure requirements singlehandedly prevents grassroots groups from participating vigorously in national
and local debate. The Supreme Court recognized as much in Federal Election
Commission v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life: “[A]dditional regulations may
create a disincentive for such organizations to engage in political speech. Detailed
record-keeping and disclosure obligations, along with the duty to appoint a
treasurer and custodian of the records, impose administrative costs that many
small entities may be unable to bear.”119 Complex disclosure promotes an
interest wholly foreign to the First Amendment: valuing formal compliance with
government-mandated disclosure over the constitutional rights of free speech.
The examples and scenarios just discussed are but manifestations of what the
Supreme Court predicted: Complicated political speech laws render compliance
for average Americans difficult and inflict constitutional harms due to the laws’
all-encompassing nature.

B. Disclose What? Even the Experts Get it Wrong
While reformers support meticulous, complex disclosure, they also seek to
expand what type of speech triggers such burdens. One might consider this a
simple issue, but to comply with a vast federal regulatory system requires some
agreement over basic legal terms. It is important to provide basic guideposts
of objectivity in any system of regulation, especially when the regulations abut
constitutional rights such as free speech.120 Without clear standards, regulators
are free to twist, bend, and mold the meaning of the law, penalizing disfavored
speakers, consciously or unconsciously. Unfortunately, today’s relevant standards
are far from clear.
The Buckley Court went to great lengths to provide objective guidance
distinguishing between regulated and unregulated political speech. In doing so,
the Court created the “express advocacy formulation,” positing that only words

117

Id.

118

Id. at 1259.

119

Fed. Election Comm’n v. Mass. Citizens for Life 479 U.S. 238, 255 (1986).

120

See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 445 (1969).
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explicitly advocating the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate
could be subject to minimal regulation.121 Issue advocacy, all speech outside
this definition—even speech mentioning candidates or commenting on their
character—is free from nearly all regulation.122 The Court’s purpose was to
establish bright-line standards thereby ensuring easy comprehension, objective
measurement, and advance notice of how the law works while protecting against
arbitrary enforcement and confusion.123 After all, it is a basic rule of law that
people must be able to understand what is expected of them.124
Following Buckley, in an anomaly case in 2003, McConnell v. Federal Election
Commission, the Supreme Court temporarily allowed regulation of a limited class
of political speech based on a fuzzy, “functional equivalent of express advocacy.”125
However, Supreme Court rulings addressing federal election law challenges after
McConnell insist on objective standards, clarity, and simplicity in operation.126
Indeed, in Citizens United, the Court recognized just how convoluted federal
election law had become, concluding that it “functions as the equivalent of prior
restraint.”127 The Court explained that “a speaker who wants to avoid threats of
criminal liability and the heavy costs of defending against FEC enforcement must
ask a governmental agency for prior permission to speak.”128 However, in the
wake of Citizens United, complexity still plagues the FEC’s regulatory system,
making compliance with even some of the most basic elements of federal election
law impracticable or impossible.
Moving from the courts to regulatory bodies, agencies often apply more
complex and open-ended standards to decide whether speech is regulated. Current
FEC regulations, for example, permit the Commission to ask whether speech is
too close or too far in time from an election to transform its classification into
regulated speech.129 The lack of a clear definition of “too close” or “too far” proves
problematic for would-be speakers. Similarly, some FEC commissioners regularly
consult a hodgepodge of unknown factors such as divining the “electoral nexus”

121

Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 44 (1976).

122

See Fed. Election Comm’n v. Wis. Right to Life, 551 U.S. 449, 456–57 (2007).

Importantly, this was considered of higher constitutional value than the maintenance of
rigorous, broad standards capable of regulating more speech. Regulations affecting speech must
often be under-inclusive leading to less rigorous enforcement in order to preserve a broader sphere
of speech from improper regulation. See Fed. Election Comm’n v. Wis. Right to Life, 551 U.S 449,
474 (2007).
123

124

Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S 104, 108–09 (1972).

125

540 U.S. 93, 206 (2003).

126

See, e.g., Citizens United v. Fed Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 333–34 (2010).

127

Id. at 335.

128

Id.

129

See 11 C.F.R. §100.22(b) (2013).
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of speech to decide if it is regulated.130 No one knows exactly what constitutes an
electoral nexus, either.
A recent interaction with the FEC demonstrates the confusion surrounding
the FEC’s own rules and regulations—even the agency itself could not make sense
of its own rules. The Wyoming group Free Speech filed an advisory opinion request
with the agency asking, among other things, whether certain advertisements would
be considered regulated or not and how to comply with the law.131 One proposed
advertisement criticized President Obama for his stance on the Government
Litigation Savings Act and asked citizens to get “engaged” and “educated” “this
November,” ending with a request to “call your neighbors” and “talk about
ranching.”132 Half of the commissioners believed that the advertisement was issue
advocacy—thus, unregulated—because different audiences could have reasonably
different interpretations of the speech in question. The other half believed it could
divine the true intent of the advertisement and understood that the end call of
the advertisement—to “talk about ranching”—could not mean what it stated.133
Under this line of reasoning, where election law experts augur the true meaning
of speech, the communication in question would have been subject to federal
regulation. This fundamental disagreement about the law caused the agency to
give little guidance to Free Speech. Ultimately, the Wyoming group Free Speech
was left unable to speak during the 2012 election cycle without the risk of violating
the mysterious law.134
People’s need for clarity about disclosure laws mandates that the type of
speech subject to regulation be abundantly clear, because the vagueness of the line
between express advocacy and issue advocacy leaves few options. These options
are to (1) register and report with the FEC, accepting its overbroad authority,
(2) remain silent, or (3) take the matter to court. The difficulties of registering
and reporting were already discussed.135 And remaining silent is far worse in
130
See, e.g., Matter Under Review 5842 (Economic Freedom Fund), Statement of Reasons of
Commissioners Cynthia L. Bauerly and Ellen L. Weintraub at 4 (FEC 2009), available at http://eqs.
nictusa.com/eqsdocsMUR/29044241152.pdf.
131
Advisory Opinion Request on Behalf of Free Speech (Feb. 29, 2012), available at http://
saos.nictusa.com/aodocs/1204965.pdf.
132

Id. at 3.

Compare Advisory Opinion 2012–11 (Free Speech) (Draft B), available at http://saos.
nictusa.com/aodocs/1206386.pdf, with Advisory Opinion 2012–11 (Free Speech) (Draft C),
available at http://saos.nictusa.com/aodocs/1207876.pdf.
133

At Free Speech’s oral argument seeking preliminary injunction against enforcement of the
speech regulation, the FEC’s counsel correctly noted that “certainly we can’t make any guarantees
that plaintiffs could never—that the commission couldn’t reach a different conclusion in the context
of enforcement. The reality is that’s probably very unlikely in this situation, at least with the current
makeup of the commission . . . . It is not a grant of immunity.” Transcript of Oral Argument at 35,
Free Speech v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 720 F.3d 788 (2013) (No. 12-CV-127), available at http://
wyliberty.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/FreeSpeech9-12-12Hearing.pdf.
134

135

See supra notes 93 –101 and accompanying text.
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a free republic. More and more groups are simply electing to take matters to
the courts, insisting on objective, clear standards.136 However, litigation is even
more expensive than burdensome compliance costs. The problems with the
complexity and overbreadth of campaign finance laws are compelling cause for
First Amendment scrutiny, but these considerations must also be combined with
a respect for anonymous political speech.

V. Anonymous Speech and the First Amendment: Varied Protection
Although courts give passing recognition to the importance of anonymous
speech and political privacy in the campaign finance realm, resulting legal
protection for anonymous speech is hardly sufficient. Some reformers, including
several U.S. senators, defend campaign finance laws with platitudes about limits
on speech, equating political speech with slander, libel, obscenity, and the greatest
cliché: “scream[ing] ‘fire’ falsely in a crowded theater.”137 This is simplistic at
best, and at worst, deceptive. However, the Supreme Court’s wide body of First
Amendment case law, though largely free speech friendly, provides the reform
community with a great deal of material on which to base new models of
speech restrictions. More aggressive pushes for all-encompassing disclosure and
transparency are the latest restrictions, their expansion has followed the loss of
other speech restrictions.
This section summarizes current levels of protection the law affords
anonymous speech. It explores how the courts have recognized great protections
for associational privacy (or speaking as an organization) and minimally expensive
political speech, yet have drastically departed from these presumptions in campaign
finance law. Following Citizens United, reformers and the FEC say donors should
be disclosed (even forced to regularly register and report as a political committee)
just to spend more than $1,000 speaking about political issues.138 This section
argues in support of new and more rigorous standards to protect the important
rights of anonymous speech and political privacy.

A. Anonymity Recognized: Association and Less-Effective Speech
At times, the Supreme Court has recognized the importance political privacy
and anonymity play in safeguarding fundamental freedoms. This protection has
extended to the rights of free speech, association, petitioning, and protection
See, e.g., Real Truth About Abortion v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 681 F.3d 544 (4th Cir.
2012); Minn. Citizens Concerned for Life v. Swanson, 692 F.3d 864 (8th Cir. 2012).
136

137
Schumer: There Ought to be Limits on First Amendment, Real Clear Politics (Jul. 17, 2012),
http://www.realclearpolitics.com/video/2012/07/17/schumer_there_ought_to_be_limits_on_
first_amendment.html (last visited Nov. 26, 2013).

See Draft B, supra note 133, at 24–25 (concluding that an organization’s major purpose
was the support or defeat of candidates because “even its non-express advocacy spending will attack
or oppose a clearly identified Federal candidate”).
138
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against government retaliation. But the Court has been hesitant to develop a
comprehensive, uniform doctrine protecting these rights.
The courts have recognized the importance in safeguarding the fundamental
freedom of association. In NAACP v. Alabama, the Court understood that effective “advocacy of both public and private points of view, particularly controversial
ones, is undeniably enhanced by group association.”139 As understood by the
NAACP Court, protection of political privacy in turn protects the right of
association given that few people are willing to associate if they know they will be
subject to harassment or retaliation.140 When analyzing whether privacy should
attach to a specific organization, the subject matter communicated by a group
plays no role in deciding the relevant constitutional protection.141 Organizations
focused on laissez-faire economics, same-sex marriage, and Rastafarianism are
protected equally. Thus, whenever government action impedes the right of
association, it is “subject to the closest scrutiny.”142
The Court also recognized the importance of political privacy in vigorously
supporting speakers acting alone, with few funds, and addressing a matter of
local concern.143 In McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission,144 the Supreme Court
invalidated the Ohio prosecution of a lone pamphleteer anonymously opposing
a school tax levy.145 The McIntyre Court understood that throughout history,
persecuted groups and dissidents particularly benefited from the protections of
anonymity.146 And in the field of “political rhetoric, where the identity of the
speaker is an important component of many attempts to persuade . . . the most
effective advocates have sometimes opted for anonymity.”147
McIntyre illustrates that the Supreme Court understood the historical
importance of anonymous speech. “On occasion, quite apart from any threat of
persecution, an advocate may believe her ideas will be more persuasive if her readers
are unaware of her identity.”148 In other words, deciding to speak anonymously is
as much a way to communicate (preserving the purity of the argument) as it is to
protect privacy. In support of this notion, the Court explained:

139

357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958).

140

Id. at 462–63.

141

Id. at 460– 61.

142

Id. at 461.

143

See also Sampson v. Buescher, 625 F.3d 1247, 1259– 61 (10th Cir. 2010).

144

McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334 (1995).

145

Id. at 357.

146

Id. at 342– 43.

147

Id. at 343.

148

Id. at 342 (citations omitted).
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American names such as Mark Twain (Samuel Langhorne
Clemens) and O. Henry (William Sydney Porter) come readily
to mind. Benjamin Franklin employed numerous different
pseudonyms . . . . Distinguished French authors such as Voltaire
(Francois Marie Arouet) and George Sand (Amandine Aurore
Lucie Dupin), and British authors such as George Eliot (Mary
Ann Evans), Charles Lamb (sometimes wrote as “Elia”), and
Charles Dickens (sometimes wrote as “Boz”), also published
under assumed names. Indeed, some believe the works of
Shakespeare were actually written by the Earl of Oxford rather
than by William Shaksper of Stratford-on-Avon.149
The Court protected Ms. McIntyre’s political privacy, reasoning that while
unpopular speakers might suffer the greatest burdens, “we assume the statute
evenhandedly burdens all speakers who have a legitimate interest in remaining
anonymous.”150 Exactly what constitutes this “legitimate interest” remains
unanswered from the Court.
The Supreme Court has also recognized the right of individuals to protect
their privacy in sensitive areas of political association. For example, the Court
found citizens have the right to refuse answering government officials’ questions
regarding their political involvement. In DeGregory v. Attorney General of the
State of New Hampshire, the Court reaffirmed the damage from forced disclosure
of “one’s associational and political past-exposure which is objectionable and
damaging in the extreme to one whose associations and political views do not
command majority approval.”151 The particular damage at issue is found in
forcing individuals who hold unorthodox, unpopular, or dissident views to
disclose their identities. From this forced disclosure follows a variety of related
injuries—government retaliation through abusive investigation as well as societal
or economic injuries by means of boycotts. In DeGregory, as in several other similar
cases, the Court required the government to show an “overriding and compelling
state interest” supporting forced disclosure.152 Thus, as these cases show, where
the government has initiated inappropriate investigations, the Court will uphold
political privacy of some groups with fortunate regularity.
Even with the recognition of the import of political privacy, the Court has
placed great, but not insurmountable, burdens on speakers hoping to realize this
very protection. In NAACP, the Court upheld the right of political privacy and
149

Id. at 341 n.4 (citations omitted).

150

Id. at 345 n.8.

151

383 U.S. 825, 829 (1966).

Id. (quoting Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539, 546 (1963)).
These cases usually involve Communist organizations in the midst of aggressive government
persecution. Id.; see also Brown v. Socialist Workers ’74 Campaign Comm., 459 U.S. 87 (1982).
152
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invalidated mandated disclosure because of the group’s “showing that on past
occasions revelation of the identity of its rank-and-file members has exposed these
members to economic reprisal, loss of employment, threat of physical coercion,
and other manifestations of public hostility.”153 Thus, in order to establish the
right of political privacy, one’s views must be so disfavored that others might
attack or fire members of the group for espousing such views. Today, some reform
advocates suggest NAACP applies only to poor people or minorities, based on
the “values” of the case, and thus its protections should not be applied “equally
to all speakers, regardless of their relative station in society.”154 However, this
analysis must be adjusted so future generations of all speakers need not lose their
livelihood or be injured in order to enjoy political privacy.
One trend emerges after surveying touchstone cases concerning political
privacy and anonymous speech: The Supreme Court understands the historical
importance of anonymity and is willing to protect it when an active government
campaign of suppression or prosecution is underfoot. While it is certainly
commendable the Court has, with some frequency, protected these rights, it is only
apt to do so under the most pressing of circumstances.155 But when government
moves more surreptitiously or causes harms that are difficult to detect, little
protection is available for speakers. Subtler scenarios present the question whether
existing judicial doctrine is sufficiently robust to protect would-be anonymous
speakers should they seek to engage in non-disclosed speech. The answer identified
by these authors is no. A helpful way to see how existing precedent fails to protect
many speakers is detailed below.
Suppose two different hypothetical groups of firearm aficionados gather
separately to rally the public about their cause of choice in 2014. The first group,
Patriots for a Revolution, believes a coalition of Jewish dissidents control the
highest branches of government thus necessitating an immediate revolution. Put
mildly, their views could be described as anti-Semitic and radical. Their activities
include door-to-door visits, pamphleteering, and infrequent Internet publications.
The group has been known to disrupt local Tea Party gatherings, get kicked out
of town hall meetings, and is frequently denied parade licenses. The group’s most
recent campaign focuses on arming elementary children with weapons in protest
against the government. In the past year, the group has received two threatening
voicemails suggesting their members will be “silenced permanently” if their antics
continue. One member’s car tires were slashed after petitioning local government
about his group’s views. Under existing case law, Patriots for a Revolution could

Dale E. Ho, NAACP v. Alabama and False Symmetry in the Disclosure Debate, 15 N.Y.U. J.
Legis. & Public. Pol’y 405, 463 (2012).
153

154

Id. at 407.

155

See generally Brown, 459 U.S. 87.

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 2014

25

Wyoming Law Review, Vol. 14 [2014], No. 1, Art. 9

278

Wyoming Law Review

Vol. 14

likely successfully apply for legal protection for political privacy given its extreme
views and the threats levied against it.156
Now consider the fate of a second organization, Patriots for a New Alliance.
This group believes the Obama Administration is harming America, supports
an aggressive recall campaign of public office-holders nationwide, frequently
protests left-of-center organizations, and maintains an active Internet presence.
The group secures seed funding from one wealthy donor with active federal
and state government business dealings. It also secures minor funding from
community participants. In the past year, it has held three roundtable events,
inviting progressive think tank leaders and Democrat officeholders to debate
their leaders over a number of issues. No one has threatened the organization
or its members, nor has any member to date been injured. The primary funder,
however, is reticent. He wishes to preserve his political privacy and participation
with the organization due, in part, to his business interests. Other members wish
to preserve their privacy simply due to their own principles. Under existing case
law, and especially under the NAACP standard, Patriots for a New Alliance would
likely not receive protection for political privacy because the organization’s views
are closer to majoritarian preferences and no one levied serious threats against
the organization.
Examine another variation on this theme. Suppose the National Rifle
Association (NRA) decides to aggressively expand its public outreach combatting
school violence.157 Its public messaging campaign involves gruesome images
of Holocaust massacres superimposed on a disarmed American public. Two
subgroups of the NRA are funding and conveying these messages in very different
parts of the United States. The first NRA subgroup spends $1.25 million on
an advertising blitz across rural Alabama where membership lists and donations
blossom as a result, even when faced with minor public retaliation. The second
NRA subgroup spends an equal amount on advertisements in the urban Portland,
Oregon, area. After its first day of advertising, ten billboards are burned, two
boycotts develop, and one member receives a death threat. Under existing
precedent, the First Amendment would treat speakers in rural Alabama much
differently than those situated in Oregon. Alabama speakers would not receive
anonymity protection, while those on the other side of the country would receive
robust First Amendment protection. Due to the asymmetry of existing doctrine,
certain types of speech in some parts of America receive the gold standard of
First Amendment protection while others receive very little protection. The
First Amendment should be applied no differently in Malibu, California as in

156

See Brown, 459 U.S. at 98–103.

Readers may substitute any organization in place of the NRA. Organizations of all political
stripes are equally subject to harassment under existing doctrine.
157

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol14/iss1/9

26

Barr and Klein: Publius Was Not a PAC: Reconciling Anonymous Political Speech, th

2014

Publius Was Not a PAC

279

Casper, Wyoming. Given that current precedent has an asymmetrical bias toward
preferring political privacy for the most extreme speakers, a few simple changes
could help the courts move toward more symmetrical, uniform protection.
The reason why such disparate results occur under the above example stems
from foundational doctrines developed by the Court. The Supreme Court’s
frequent jurisprudential experiments often result in accordion-like judicial tests for
deciding the constitutionality of an issue over time. In many instances, the Court
retracts from expansive and intricate tests in favor of simplicity, as most recently
seen in Citizens United.158 While the Court had, for a time, signaled that more
flexible balancing tests would be appropriate to determine the level of protection
given to some forms of political speech, it discontinued this approach in favor of
simple and clear benchmarks.159 This was due to, in part, the unworkability of the
previous doctrine the Court had developed.160
So too may the Court revisit its asymmetrical anonymity doctrine. Courts
may simply recognize the inherent First Amendment value of political privacy and
anonymity and grant it full, prospective protection.161 This requires eliminating
many balancing tests and complicated judicial doctrine. Although these formulas
adequately protected anonymity in crisis situations or for the most persecuted
or radical organizations, a broader doctrine would afford the same protection
for all classes of speakers in all situations. Thus, instead of waiting for an abusive
government investigation into the operation of a civil rights group, that group
could rest assured in absolute prospective protection. Instead of becoming a
marginalized radical group before receiving the protection of anonymity, all classes
of speakers would be protected. This approach is tied to a principle endorsed by
the Framers and the Supreme Court, chiefly, “the people in our democracy are
entrusted with the responsibility for judging and evaluating the relative merits of
conflicting arguments.”162
Evaluating current anonymity doctrine requires asking an implicit value
question.163 For the NAACP Court, protecting the anonymity of disfavored,
minority speakers proved important, but only upon a strong showing of serious

158

Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 336 (2010).

159

Id. at 323–34.

Id. at 334 –35 (detailing that while the Court attempted to develop an objective test, it
resulted in the adoption of a “two-part, 11-factor balancing test”).
160

161
Of course, the Court might favor streamlining its current approach, as it did in Citizens
United, to provide more workable standards, broader protection for the exercise of free speech and
associational rights, and clarity for prospective speakers.
162

First Nat. Bank of Bos. v. Belloti, 435 U.S. 765, 791 (1978).

Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 856 (1992) (“The
Constitution serves human values.”).
163
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harm.164 This only begs the question why must citizens wait to have their lives
destroyed, or face serious injury, before their rights are realized? In the context of
the Fourth Amendment’s protection against unreasonable searches and seizures,
we do not afford protection only to disfavored groups that have been harassed by
police officers.165 Nor do we align the Second Amendment’s protection to groups
who show they are subject to crime or harm.166 When it comes to the question of
protecting political privacy, existing precedent asks citizens to put their livelihoods
and reputations on the line before the judiciary will protect them. More uniform
and objective protection would proactively prevent much government harassment
and would, at a minimum, offer a remedy at law where government did abuse
speakers’ rights. First Amendment precedent needs to evolve to offer uniform
protection like that realized in other areas of constitutional concern to prevent
against the harms outlined in this article. As discussed later, an excellent start is
found in applying the strict scrutiny standard to all disclosure systems.167
Courts must seriously question whether existing judicial doctrine is sufficiently
robust to protect political privacy and anonymity. Following existing precedent,
anonymity may be realized (1) retroactively or during the midst of government
abuse, or (2) prospectively for a handful of organizations that can make a showing
of serious harm or abuse as a result of exercising First Amendment freedoms.168
We may simply build on this trend, developing more conditions and subconditions where political privacy would be recognized. With the recent tragedy
at Sandy Hook,169 for example, courts might recognize broad privacy interests
related to speech and association concerning Second Amendment issues. As new
controversies of the day arise, from abortion to international intervention and
every point in-between, the courts could create a hodgepodge of balancing tests
further protecting various aspects of political privacy. These future controversies
might work to protect certain issues and groups on a case-by-case basis.170 But
164

NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 461 (1958).

See, e.g., Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989) (applying an “objectively reasonable”
excessive force analysis); Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 249 (1991) (applying objective standard
for scope of unreasonable search analysis).
165
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See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 602 (2008).

167

See infra notes 197–200 and accompanying text.

168

See supra notes 139–167 and accompanying text.

See generally “Sandy Hook Elementary School Shooting,” Huffington Post, http://www.
huffingtonpost.com/news/sandy-hook-elementary-school-shooting/ (last visited Nov. 26, 2013).
169

170
The development of this line of conduct would lead to a modified version of the Heckler’s
Veto working in the realm of political speech. See, e.g., Forsyth Cnty., Ga. v. Nationalist Movement,
505 U.S. 123 (1992). If organizations wished to secure political privacy under the law they could
do so through a campaign of fake death threats, harassment, and public outrage. This would lead
to active manipulation of the law, allowing some to secure political privacy through orchestrated
campaigns of public nuisance. Unlike traditional Heckler’s Veto scenarios, this policy would result
in the government promotion of fake public-outrage campaigns to move organizations or issued
into the field of protected controversial speech.
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this approach would sacrifice the sensibility of protecting political privacy in a
broad, uniform manner at the expense of a slow, evolutionary development of
complicated balancing tests. Another alternative protects political privacy in a
more uniform and meaningful way.
Under the current doctrine, and under the above examples, individuals
conveying deeply anti-Semitic messages receive greater First Amendment
protection than individuals conveying more mainstream ideas. Consider the type
of society you prefer to live in. Is it one where voices of political concern are
marginalized and encouraged by government action to become more extreme,
loud, and erratic so political privacy is achieved? Or one where everyone’s voice is
welcome, whether they identify themselves or not, and we trust citizens to engage
in responsible civic public debate about these issues? One model of thought—
currently subscribed to by the courts—supports hyper-partisanship as a means of
securing political privacy and pushes more moderate voices to the wayside. But an
emerging model of thought, one espoused in this article, asks why citizens must
first be injured, threatened, or believe in the most outlandish causes just to receive
adequate First Amendment protection in the first place. This experiment has gone
far enough. A free society should protect everyone’s political privacy and not leave
it as a luxury for the most extreme elements of our society.
The approach suggested by these authors is much more simple, fundamental,
and workable than a hodgepodge of judicial doctrines only sometimes protecting
political privacy. At the same time, enhanced clamoring about the supposed
beneficial consequences of “disclosure” and political pressure for campaign
finance reform will likely limit legislative options moving in that direction. This
is an unfortunate reality: more speakers must suffer abuse or self-censor due to
insufficient First Amendment protection.171 However, as bullying, retaliation, and
threats continue in the political process, opportunities to refine existing doctrine
will emerge. The chilling facts of these cases will eventually become too much
for the law to bear,172 and courts should afford themselves the opportunity to
streamline complicated doctrine toward simpler and more speech-protective tests.

B. Moving Forward: Adopting a Bright Line Approach
As it stands today, serious problems plague the preservation of First Amendment
political privacy related to campaign finance disclosure. Mechanically, existing
regimes regulate with blurry lines, making compliance difficult and pushing
many out of political discourse entirely.173 Substantively, the positive value of
171

Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 43 (1976).
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See generally Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).

See, e.g., Jeffrey Milyo, Campaign Finance Red Tape: Strangling Free Speech & Political Debate,
Institute for Justice (Oct. 2007), available at http://www.ij.org/images/pdf_folder/other_pubs/
CampaignFinanceRedTape.pdf.
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political privacy has been largely undone, leaving its protection to the most
radical elements of our society.174 At the same time, the relative value of disclosure
is viewed positively as to its superficial operation.175 To rectify these problems and
better protect political privacy, a few enhancements to election law are suggested.
Although wholesale protection of political anonymity in any form would
provide the most respect for free speech, more immediate, practical steps are
available. Toward this end, there are four suggestions to enhance meaningful
political privacy:
1. Ensure full protection of anonymity for issue advocacy speech.
2. Eliminate ad hoc judicial determinations to uphold political privacy.
3. Require simple disclosure, not PAC burdens, where it is properly
invoked and review these regulations with strict scrutiny.
4. Insist on higher aggregate contribution or expenditure thresholds
triggering disclosure regimes.
The first suggestion requires courts to recognize that some speech, whatever its
boundaries, is entitled to anonymity under the First Amendment. Clear lines and
well-distinguished judicial reasoning help guide prospective speakers, ensuring
people understand where regulated speech ends and free speech begins. No matter
the area of First Amendment jurisprudence, the Supreme Court is stringent on
protecting against overzealous and overbroad applications of legitimate laws.176
This is shown in the context of anti-obscenity measures, torts, and other areas of
the law.177 Anonymous political speech is entitled to at least as much clarity, but
the Supreme Court continues its struggle to craft such a formulation. Although
issue advocacy was once distinctly distinguished from express advocacy and
protected from disclosure, some legislatures, executive bodies, and courts have
diligently dismantled that distinction.178 This includes developing several versions
of the express advocacy standard to capture more political speech.179
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Brown v. Socialist Workers ’74 Campaign Comm., 459 U.S. 87 (1982).
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See supra note 12 and accompanying text.

See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S.
513 (1958).
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See, e.g., Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58 (1963); N.Y. Times, 376 U.S. 254;
Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. Dallas, 390 U.S. 676 (1968); Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S.
46 (1988).
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See, e.g., Free Speech v. Fed. Election Comm’n, Wyo. Liberty Grp., http://wyliberty.org/
legal-center/free-speech-v-federal-election-commission/ (last visited Nov. 26, 2013).
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See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 44 n.52 (1976); McConnell v. Fed. Election
Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 206 (2003); Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310,
324–25 (2010).
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Because of this confusion about boundaries when considering disclosure,
some courts have gone so far as to make anonymous political speech a dead
letter.180 The Buckley Court’s express advocacy formulation worked to preserve
two goals.181 First, it permitted government regulation of political speech to
occur where correct government interests were implicated.182 Second, it properly
cabined the reach of that regulation by demanding upon stringent standards of
clarity.183 Those advocating reform criticized the Buckley approach due to it being
easily evaded.184 Using words just beyond the pale of express advocacy could shield
speech from regulation. But it also meant that speakers could easily understand
which speech was regulated and prevented substantial overreach.
As identified earlier, today’s body of election law implicates regulation
for express advocacy, the “functional equivalent” of express advocacy, and
electioneering communications. Moreover, the rigor of division between these
categories of speech has weakened and no shortage of confusion has erupted as
speakers fail to know in advance which category their prospective advertisements
fall into. This was the very cause of concern identified in Buckley: adopt too
fluid of standards and free speech will suffer.185 Moving the law to cement easily
identifiable speech standards that average individuals can understand and which
limit tendencies for government abuse is the only known solution to this problem.
In the development of election law following McConnell v. Federal Election
Commission, it is becoming apparent that the Court is streamlining regulable
speech standards in exactly this way. This has not happened without a struggle
in the Court. While McConnell upheld most new regulations contained in the
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (“BCRA”),186 its successor case, Federal Election
Commission v. Wisconsin Right to Life, narrowed the reach of the law. The WRTL
Court would not accept a facial challenge to BCRA’s ban of electioneering
communications by corporations and unions, but it allowed an as-applied
challenge to limit the reach of the law.187 In doing so, it attempted to clarify the
“functional equivalent of express advocacy” standard by explaining that “an ad is
the functional equivalent of express advocacy only if the ad is susceptible of no
reasonable interpretation other than as an appeal to vote for or against a specific

Bailey v. Maine Comm’n on Governmental Ethics and Election Practices, 900 F. Supp. 2d
75 (D. Me. Sept. 30, 2012).
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Buckley, 424 U.S. at 43–45.

182

Id. at 45.
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candidate.”188 This included examining factors like whether the communications
“focus on a legislative issue, take a position on the issue, exhort the public to
adopt that position, and urge the public to contact public officials with respect
to the matter.”189 In stating the test, Chief Justice Roberts went to great lengths
to reinforce that the test was objective and did not suffer from many problems of
vagueness found in past election law standards.190
The FEC responded to its loss in WRTL by fashioning what the Supreme
Court called a “two-part, 11–factor balancing test to implement WRTL’s ruling.”191
In seeing just how flexible, open-ended, and far-reaching of standards the FEC
would design, the Court allowed a facial challenge to the speech ban contained in
the BCRA and eliminated it entirely.192 In doing so, the Court explained that the
sheer size and complexity of the FEC’s standards acted as a prior restraint against
speech.193 As a result, only speech regulations sounding in objectivity and clarity
could survive.
As prior litigation demonstrates, inarticulate and intricate speech standards
create a chilling effect against speakers and cause real injury to First Amendment
rights. Whatever zeal there may be for aggressive enforcement of campaign finance
provisions, the Constitution compels a simple adherence to baseline standards.
Because disclosure is a type of campaign finance regulation and because regulatory
standards matter very much, it is equally important to ensure that bright line
standards (like the Buckley formulation) apply.194
The second suggestion flows from the first: anonymous political speech
should not be reserved only for those who can make it to court. Broad, uniform
standards eliminate political maneuvering and manipulation of existing disclosure
standards. Under current law, only the most extreme, far-flung voices are
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Id. at 474 n.7 (explaining that the Court’s test was not vague because “(1) there can be no
free-ranging intent-and-effect test; (2) there generally should be no discovery or inquiry into the
sort of ‘contextual’ factors highlighted by the FEC and interveners; (3) discussion of issues cannot
be banned merely because the issues might be relevant to an election; and (4) in a debatable case,
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It remains an ongoing point of debate within election law circles about whether disclosure
systems are different in kind from other forms of campaign finance and thus subject to less rigorous
standards. See, e.g., Anthony Johnstone, A Madisonian Case for Disclosure, 19 Geo. Mason L.
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protected against disclosure provisions.195 This creates a haphazard, accordionlike approach to preserving political privacy. Supporters of controversial issues of
the day may enjoy complete anonymity while moderate speakers are tasked with
full disclosure. This sort of asymmetrical disclosure regime ensures that radical
and fringe views are better protected than neighborhood, middle-of-the-road
voices. All speakers, regardless of message, deserve prospective protection against
government retaliation. Only uniform and equal standards achieve this just result.
Moving toward uniform standards for disclosure would entail a major shift
in existing norms weighing the value of speakers’ political privacy greater than the
government’s interest in disclosure. More concretely, litigants would have to make
compelling arguments why the three liberty interests identified in this article—
preventing prejudice, keeping the message central, and preventing retaliation—are
superior to government interests in disclosure, usually identified as keeping the
electorate as informed about who is spending money for political messaging. To
date, litigation has focused primarily on the retaliation interest and small classes
of speakers rightfully become exempt when certain conditions are met. At times,
groups like the American Civil Liberties Union and the Chamber of Commerce
have argued, in part, about the prejudice issue but not with sizeable effort.196
Litigation efforts would have to focus on the negative effects of disclosure that
have largely been overlooked in campaign finance case law. This would include
illustrating why an organization’s desire for the public to focus solely on its
message is more important than the public’s interest in knowing who is behind it.
Or it would involve showings by disfavored, but not radical, groups why exposing
their names or identities would be so damning. Examples might include Tea Party
organizations messaging in Berkley, California or fiery rhetorical campaigns by
Earth First! in Cheyenne, Wyoming. Through this slow percolation of cases, the
value and strength of these liberty interests might be identified and strengthened,
expanding the scope of protection for anonymity.
The third suggestion calls for simple, straightforward disclosure. Existing
simple disclosure regimes, triggered each time an organization or individual speak
out using a certain amount of money, adequately promote government disclosure

In the midst of writing this article, the National Abortion Rights Action League (“NARAL”)
of NY received an exemption to New York’s far-reaching disclosure rules because they “could put its
contributors in danger.” Rick Karlin, Pro-choice lobbyist cites danger to donors in winning exemption,
Times Union (June 26, 2013), http://www.timesunion.com/local/article/Pro-choice-lobbyist-citesdanger-to-donors-in-4624792.php (last visited Nov. 26, 2013). Notably, NARAL is the sole group
in New York exempt from its disclosure laws.
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interests without imposing complicated, continuing reporting regimes.197 For
too long, popular media and campaign finance reform groups have conflated
imposing disclosure requirements with PAC requirements.198 One or two-page
disclosure forms provide information called for by the Supreme Court: (a) who
is spending money, (b) given toward what particular candidate race, and (c) in
what amount.199 More detailed PAC requirements impose a heavy and bizarre
set of regulations on average speakers, making the exercise of First Amendment
freedoms “onerous.”200 Insisting that simplified disclosure is the norm would help
achieve reformers’ interests in disclosure while alleviating much of the burdens
current disclosure regimes impose.
Finally, the fourth suggestion acts as a buffer against burdensome laws for
average speakers. Here, requiring higher aggregate disclosure thresholds ensures
grassroots groups are not burdened by intricate, lengthy forms more appropriately
required for sophisticated, large political organizations. The core holding of
Mass. Citizens for Life supports this idea, positing that extensive reporting and
organizational requirements should only apply to groups whose major purpose
is serious campaign activity.201 Increasing aggregate thresholds for difficult
compliance regimes (like PAC status) ensures ordinary citizens are not shut out of
the political system due to legal intricacies while only leaving sophisticated, better
funded political professionals to handle such intricacies. This last set of suggestions
is hardly new: reformers and First Amendment advocates have regularly called for
increasing threshold campaign finance disclosure limits.202
Taken as a whole, these suggestions would work in very much the same way
other areas of reform have been modified due to constitutional concerns. For
example, it used to be commonly accepted that state laws punishing defamatory or
libelous statements could be broadly designed and applied. Through concentrated
effort, litigants were able to convince the Supreme Court, first in New York Times
Co. v. Sullivan, that the First Amendment demanded more safeguards apply to
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the liberty interests protected in speech.203 While weighty interests supported the
availability of libel and defamation remedies for aggrieved parties, the Supreme
Court ultimately held that the liberty interests supporting the First Amendment
carried greater weight. Or, as the Court stated, our “profound national
commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited,
robust, and wide-open, and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and
sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials” carries
special consideration.204
Part of the sea change in tort law as it relates to the First Amendment was
due to litigants sharply illustrating how cumbersome laws (born out of legitimate
concern) damaged their liberty interests. In New York Times Co., the government
attempted to paint its system of libel law as being protective of speech because it
allowed truth as an ultimate defense. The problem was easy to identify: “Under
such a rule, would-be critics of official conduct may be deterred from voicing
their criticism, even though it is believed to be true and even though it is in fact
true, because of doubt whether it can be proved in court or fear of the expense
of having to do so. They tend to make only statements which ‘steer far wider
of the unlawful zone.’”205 Because the litigants could plainly demonstrate just
how difficult the law was to comply with and how suppressive it would likely
be, the Supreme Court embraced a doctrinal shift toward protecting these types
of speech.
Just as so many regulatory programs have shrunken with the application of
the First Amendment, so too does the reach of campaign finance reform and
disclosure. The recommendations provided in this article would achieve similar
results: (1) average speakers would be protected from cumbersome regulatory
regimes, (2) more meaningful scrutiny and objective regulatory guideposts would
provide quicker remedies to speakers whose rights had been abused, and (3) a
greater prospective protection for political privacy would result. All of this would
work toward harmony in the law. Streamlined disclosure would remain but
overreaching and complicated regulatory regimes would be substantially trimmed.

VI. Conclusion
Publius was not a PAC. Rather, it was an association of three people who
sought to speak out in favor of a governing document, one that endures today.
As campaign finance disclosure expands to require registration and reporting of
individuals and groups who wish to merely speak out on a political issue, Publius’s
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example may soon be illegal for such intents and purposes. The end of anonymous
political speech and political privacy (for all but the most extreme voices)
threatens not only speech itself, but truthfulness and forthrightness from those
who do speak. As in McIntyre, we must recognize and reaffirm that anonymity is
as much a choice of what someone is saying as how he or she says it. Such content
restrictions must be strictly scrutinized by our courts and narrowly tailored to
serve a governmental interest. For issue advocacy, in particular, disclosure serves
no compelling governmental interest.
Narrow tailoring also requires simple, understandable disclosure laws. We
should not tolerate a system of “reform” that makes participation in the political
process and speaking one’s mind arduous. Whatever merit disclosure may have,
today’s system is harmful to the First Amendment and these harms outweigh
any of disclosure’s benefits. A streamlined, understandable system of political
disclosure would reclaim First Amendment protections and ensure the right of
average Americans so bold as to spend more than $1,000 to speak their minds. In
time, this nation might reclaim the lost ideal and “assume that this information
is not in itself harmful, that people will perceive their own best interests if only
they are well enough informed, and that the best means to that end is to open the
channels of communication rather than to close them.”206
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